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I never had any interest in law when I was younger. The only memory that truly stands 
out to me is when I recall my mother and father being shocked at the news that a man named An-
tonin Scalia had died. I had no idea who this person was, and why it was such a big deal that he 
had passed away. I distinctly remember my mother telling me how he had been a harsh and po-
larizing figure on the Supreme Court, despite his enormous intellect. I didn’t realize it at the time, 
but I would soon become enamored with this figure during a course my junior year of high 
school, which would lead me down the path of investigating his signature interpretive theory: 
constitutional originalism. 
This class, informally known as Gov and Civ, was not even about law, and we only de-
voted one unit to the Supreme Court. This chapter of the class was more than enough to spark 
my interest in the land’s highest court. I soon became intrigued by different jurisprudential phi-
losophies, and I became captivated by the different members of the Court. However, there was 
one Justice in particular that stood out to me. In my free time I would fervently watch interviews 
and read about the same Supreme Court Justice my mom had once told me about when I was lit-
tle, Antonin Scalia. 
The man I watched in the interviews seemed different than the person I read about 
online. Scalia came off as charismatic, jovial, and witty. As I read some of his judicial opinions I 
started to realize how intellectually brilliant he truly was. Regardless of whether or not I agreed 
with the outcome of the decision he was voting on, I felt that he was able to turn the most bland 
case into an interesting and compelling read. I also was surprised by how he used his intelligence 
to fire not-so-subliminal shots at some of his colleagues whom he disagreed with. Even though I 
am pretty apolitical, I was deeply inspired by the way he was able to manipulate language to get 
his point across. I know some people admired Scalia because they were deeply conservative and 
agreed with his political ideology, but this is not the case for me. My admiration for the deceased 
has nothing to do with politics and everything with how he influenced my perception of law. In 
Scalia’s opinions he was able to make a seemingly mundane issue compelling. As I continued my 
research on Scalia, the same word repeatedly emerged. Originalism. When I looked up what 
originalism was, my initial reaction was that I must be misunderstanding the theory, as it seemed 
far too basic to ever work.   
I wondered what led Scalia to choose originalism as his guiding doctrine to reading the 
law. I asked myself, Why would Scalia want to defer to the will of these slave-owning white men 
from hundreds of years ago? How is originalism even possible, giving that life is so different 
now than it was when the Constitution was drafted? I wanted to write about originalism primar-
ily because it interested me, but also because I felt that by diving deeper into the subject I would 
be able to formulate my own ideas about whether I agreed with it or not. 
The United States Constitution was drafted in the year 1787, and even after over 200 
years there are still arguments surrounding how this document should be applied to America to-
day. There are two broad schools of thought on this issue. The first is the idea of a living Consti-
tution. Living constitutionalists believe this document to be malleable, that the Constitution is 
meant to bend and change to reflect the ideas and beliefs of the American people. The latter 
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school of thought is that of the dead Constitution. Supporters of this method of interpretation be-
lieve that the meaning of this document remains fixed, and that the law of the land does not 
change by itself, only through passed legislation (Solum 2). Within these broad categories there 
are numerous branches of interpretation, such as consequentialism, intentionalism, and purposiv-
ism for the living Constitution, along with strict constructionism, textualism, and originalism for 
the dead Constitution (Calabresi). 
Steven Calabresi, a professor of Law at the Northwestern Pritzker School of Law and 
Chairman of the Federalist Society defines originalism, saying that “originalists believe that the 
constitutional text ought to be given the original public meaning that it would have had at the 
time that it became law. The original meaning of constitutional texts can be discerned from dic-
tionaries, grammar books, and from other legal documents from which the text might be bor-
rowed” (Calabresi). 
One complaint about originalism is that it is not a reasonable interpretive device, since 
there were certain scenarios that the Founding Fathers were not able to envision, such as the in-
ternet, or the application of the Second Amendment to military-grade weapons when the most 
potent gun in 1787 was a musket. One of the most adamant proponents of originalism, the late 
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, addresses this grievance in one interview by saying “you 
should not interpret language strictly, nor should you interpret it sloppily, you should interpret it 
reasonably” (“Text and Intent”). Scalia then goes on to give the example of reasonable interpreta-
tion for the First Amendment, saying that somebody who would be interpreting the text hyper-
literally (in this case, a strict constructionist), would construe the First Amendment to prohibit 
hand written letters since it is not press or speech, when clearly this is not what the law means, as 
free speech functions as a synecdoche to include hand-written letters (“Text and Intent”). 
Another complaint about originalism is that it is too difficult to find the original mean-
ing of the words. Originalists counter this premise by noting that scholars decipher the meaning 
of texts far older and longer than this 4,543 word document (“Constitution Facts”). Originalists 
also contend that if we agree that it is too challenging to find the original meaning of the text, 
then it should be impossible to find the original intentions and thoughts of those who drafted the 
document, as living constitutionalists claim (Gorsuch). 
Originalism, and frankly the entire conception of a dead Constitution raises serious 
questions of morality and ethics for me. The Constitution is great in some ways, as it was able to 
establish the United States as a democratic entity and first world power. I respect the Founding 
Fathers’ intelligence, foresight, and will to create a document that forever changed the course of 
human history. However, their actions and beliefs compared to the standards of today’s society 
are seen as clear indications of bigotry and prejudice. While they favored liberty for those who 
looked and behaved like them, the Constitution under the Founding Fathers kept people of color 
as slaves, did not allow women the right to vote, and prohibited many other rights that are staples 
of our society today (Greene 1-6).   
This idea of rule by dead hand poses the question of whether the Constitution should 
be abolished, since it was written without input of the complete population of citizens of the 
United States. While I am not advocating that the Constitution should be completely thrown 
away, I am wary of any method of interpretation that decides what rights we are allowed by the 
standards of 1787 rather than 2021. It feels difficult for me to fully support a method of interpre-
tation that suggests going back in time and interpreting the Constitution based on what these 
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slave-owning white men agreed upon. This is what scares me most about originalism and the en-
tire idea of a dead Constitution, that following this interpretive theory will stall the just social 
progress and evolution of equality that we have slowly seen since the document’s inception. I 
worry that originalism will move America backwards in time towards the days of slavery and 
bigotry (Greene 1-6). 
The alternative to a dead method of interpretation is a living Constitution. Originalists 
quip that this would be great for interpreting the law if everybody agreed on what the ideal laws 
are for the country, but this is not the case. Additionally, some people believe this idea goes 
against the idea of separation of powers and gives judges more power than they are intended to 
have. Certain people believe that in a living Constitution judges become the law-makers. Skep-
tics of this method say that in a living Constitution, the people who have the most power are 
those who are sworn in for life. One of the merits of the current system is that legislators are held 
accountable to the people. If citizens disagree with the laws their representatives are passing, 
they have the power to take away their support for that candidate. Under a living Constitution, 
nine Supreme Court Justices hold all the power to bend and change the law any way they see fit, 
with arguably no restrictions. There are supporters of originalism who genuinely believe it is 
necessary to combat what they see as the possible despotism that the framers of the Constitution 
wanted to get away from. 
The idea of originalism makes sense to me when I consider how people interpret cur-
rent laws, regulations, and ordinances. When I see a red light I obey the law and don’t run the 
light. I don't see the light and think, This doesn’t apply here, since the law was created to prevent 
traffic accidents, and I am a skilled enough driver to drive safely. A reasonable person would not 
think this, they would obey the law instead of inserting their own wants and desires. However, 
not all laws should necessarily be interpreted the same way, so perhaps this thought is moot. This 
metaphor also presents certain questions that reflect the difficulty of interpreting the Constitution 
today, such as whether or not it is acceptable to run the light if you are driving somebody who 
needs urgent care to a hospital, or if it’s acceptable for a police officer to run a red light in the 
pursuit of protecting citizen’s liberties. 
  The idea of originalism also resonates with me when I think about how language changes 
over time, as a consistent reading of legal provisions could prevent courts from erroneous inter-
pretations. When one reads a book, the proper way to understand the text is to know what the 
words meant when they were written, not what they may mean now. While the word “gay” may 
refer to a man or woman who loves somebody of the same gender, a person would be incorrect 
to interpret the term as this when reading a 17th century text where they described a gay man, as 
the word gay only began to shift from meaning happy, publicly, in the 1960’s (Bollinger). The 
originalist idea of words having fixed meaning has some appeal to me, as it is possible to envi-
sion scenarios where the meanings of words change over generations, resulting in a law that is 
far different from what the legislature intended. 
Additionally, how does one surmise the intentions of the legislature? This seems to me 
like a far more challenging process than finding the original meaning of the text. This challeng-
ing intentionalism process leaves much room for subjectivity, and for the judge to insert their 
own predilections where they see fit. The similar but slightly different approach to intentionalism 
is purposivism, where a text is to be interpreted based on the intended purpose of the statute 
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(Scalia and Garner 19). Justice Wendell Oliver Holmes said that “we do not inquire what the leg-
islature meant; we ask only what the statute means" (Jackson). As Antonin Scalia said, if the pur-
pose of a law is what is most important, a judge “is free to climb up this ladder of purposes and to 
‘fill in’ or change the text according to the level of generality he has chosen” (Scalia and Garner 
19). 
In order to assess originalism’s validity, we must evaluate the burden it places on the 
judge, and how this interpretive theory does or does not coincide with the role the judiciary is 
supposed to fulfill. According to the Code of Conduct for United States judges, one of the essen-
tial tenets for this position is “a judge should be faithful to, and maintain professional compe-
tence in, the law and should not be swayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criti-
cism” (“Code of Conduct for United States Judges”). Clearly judges must act fairly and not be 
influenced by their own predilections or political opinions, yet there are still some differences in 
theory among judges about how these judicial duties should be exercised. Some judges believe 
their role is to interpret only what has been written, and leave the ability to change the law to the 
legislature. Chief Justice John Roberts said that “Judges and Justices are servants of the law, not 
the other way around. Judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them. 
The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure everybody plays by the rules, but it 
is a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball game to see the umpire” (“Chief Justice Roberts 
Statement”). 
Other members of the judiciary believe the Constitution is purposely vague, and that it 
is the job of the judge to fill in the gaps between what the Founding Fathers wrote in 1787 and 
the societal standards in 2021. Justice Elena Kagan sees her role as a judge in a more liberal 
manner, saying that “sometimes [the Framers] laid down very specific rules, sometimes they laid 
down broad principles. Either way, we apply what they say, what they meant to do. And so, in 
that sense, we are all originalists” (Baude). Kagan seems to interpret originalism far more loosely 
than Scalia, providing an alternate perspective of the originalist doctrine.  
Is a judge supposed to interpret the law only based on what is already there? Or is a 
judge supposed to change the law to in order to reflect the changing current of societal expecta-
tions and beliefs? On one hand, I see the argument for a judge who would want to interpret the 
Constitution loosely. This is a document that was written hundreds of years ago in a time and 
place completely different than the world we live in today. The Founders must have purposely 
left their words and phrases unclear, as the subsequent generations would interpret them to fit the 
normative behavior and beliefs agreed upon by their society. If we interpret the words as they 
were written and understood at the time they were enacted, we will be living life under the tenets 
and values of 18th century America instead of today’s nation. It is not as if these judges are tak-
ing the law into their own hands, as the law is so purposely unclear. It is not certain the scope of 
how phrases like equal protection of the law and due process of law are to be interpreted. Does 
equal protection mean that same sex marriage must be legal? Does equal protection mean affirm-
ative action is unconstitutional? Does due process mean the death penalty is constitutional? 
There are an infinite number of questions that only grow as society progresses and new circum-
stances are applied to the Constitution (“Constitution: A Living Document or Not?”). The idea 
that the document in its entirety is an all-encompassing instrument readily applicable to any and 
every situation can seem foolish.   
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As I continued to research originalism, I began to realize that my perception of this 
supposedly objective judicial philosophy was not nearly as pure and impartial as I had thought it 
to be. I began to realize that the assumptions I had made about originalism were misplaced, that I 
so hoped Scalia would be right about this interpretive theory. Sadly, the more I read about the 
topic the more disappointed I became. What’s so interesting about the narrative that dead consti-
tutionalists cite when slandering liberal judges, is that these originalists and strict constructionists 
sometimes abuse the law in exactly the way they accuse liberal judges of doing.  There seems to 
be a common thread floating amongst the legal stratosphere that we need to get rid of judicial ac-
tivism in the courts, that the liberals serving on the bench are partisan legislators disguised as 
judges. Certain people denounce the idea of a living Constitution because they say that it gives 
the judges too much power, that these judges are rewriting the law to fit their own political 
agenda when they should be adhering to what is written. The irony in this is that the same people 
who preach fidelity to the text only choose to follow their dead constitutional doctrine when it 
fits their personal beliefs. Proponents of originalism accuse the living constitutionalists of tyran-
nical behavior and say that they are taking away the agreed-upon rights of the American people, 
when originalists are the ones who cite hundred-plus year old texts to try to take agreed-upon 
rights such as abortion, gay marriage, and affirmative action away. A more liberal manner of 
constitutional interpretation could be useful in bridging the political divide between parties. Be-
cause of the increasingly polarizing nature of politics it is more and more difficult to get legisla-
tion through Washington, so giving judges more rein to help this country could be a practical so-
lution. 
The preamble, which establishes the purpose of the Constitution and how it should act 
says “We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Jus-
tice, ensure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, 
and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this 
Constitution for the United States of America” (“The U.S. Constitution: Preamble”). 
This part of the document establishes an interesting point about democracy and how it 
should operate. Clearly forming a more perfect union is the purpose of this Constitution, but that 
does not mean that people are free to act however they want as long as it is working towards this 
end. We all want to sustain and reinforce the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, 
but this does not give citizens free rein to become vigilantes and take the law into their own 
hands whenever they see fit. The same is true for the judiciary, and all three branches of govern-
ment. A key component of our government is separation of powers. The English government that 
was in power before the U.S. was tyrannical with power overly-centralized and concentrated in 
the hands of a few people. This caused the English to establish laws that didn’t reflect the will of 
the people. The Founding Fathers wanted to get away from this despotism, and one way they did 
this was through properly apportioning the duties afforded to each section of our democracy. By 
distributing power throughout three different branches of government, no one person or group is 
able to rule unfairly over the citizens as the English once did. 
Broadly and simplistically speaking, the role of the judiciary is to interpret the law. It 
makes sense that if people consider judges to be making the law rather than solely interpreting it, 
this would seem like a violation of separation of powers and a step in the direction of tyranny. 
However, there is an argument to be made that conservative judges have their own moments of 
judicial activism on the bench. Originalists are able to shape the law in the manner they see fit by 
interpreting it strictly. Whenever an area of the Constitution is vague, originalist judges interpret 
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the law in a manner that just so happens to coincide with their own political agenda, as they 
cloak themselves in the protection of so-called loyalty to the text. However, when a law they 
think ought to be clearly defined is not, they have the ability to make a provision inexplicably ap-
pear. When Antonin Scalia was a member of the Supreme Court he was often accused of picking 
and choosing when he applied his originalist doctrine. The irony of originalism is that it perpetu-
ates everything that it says to go against. Originalism has the potential to move our society back 
in time towards the beliefs and policies of the 18th century. 
I think what keeps me from outrightly denouncing originalism is that it appeals to my 
fear of usurpation of power by a single branch of government. It is marketed as an objective ap-
proach that casts politics aside and decides cases based on previous laws. When I see how 
originalism is applied however, I don’t like what I see. Instead of restraining the judges, it re-
strains the American people, taking away rights agreed upon and renewed by common law prec-
edent, and moving the society farther and farther back to how life was in 1787. I appreciate that 
originalism limits judicial power, but there must be other interpretive methods that can accom-
plish this goal, while still advancing American liberties. It’s also not as if originalism is an unbi-
ased method, it clearly pushes forward the conservative agenda under the guise of apoliticism. 
At the same time, I see the merits of originalism, especially theoretically. It makes 
sense to me that people would be skeptical of the idea of a living Constitution, since this could 
be interpreted as an abridgment of power. Living constitutionalists assume that the Constitution 
is meant to be interpreted reasonably, since clearly that is what the Founding Fathers wanted. But 
as Antonin Scalia said, “it is precisely because people differ over what is sensible and what is de-
sirable that we elect those who will write our laws—and expect the courts to observe what has 
been written” (Scalia and Gardner 22). I understand the idea that it is not the job of the judge to 
guess what the Founders meant, the intention of the Founders should be reflected in the laws 
passed by the legislature. Additionally, one could argue that it is not the job of a judge to rewrite 
the law to reflect what they see fit. I see how living constitutionalist theories such as purposivism 
and intentionalism could be scantily clad guises for judicial activism. Whilst searching for the 
Founder’s intention or the purpose of the law, the judge could inevitably choose what they think 
the purpose or intention ought to be, rather than what it is. Separation of powers exists for a rea-
son, and one of those reasons is to constrain the judiciary (Scalia and Gardner 30). 
I think there is a way to find a median between the liberal and conservative jurispru-
dential approaches, and that middle ground comes through respecting and emphasizing prece-
dent. The English common law tradition adopted by the United States is the best way for the law 
to evolve organically over time while still reflecting changing societal standards. I believe that 
this premise is able to answer many questions about the role of the judiciary. Respecting prior 
rulings of courts may be able to solve many problems, but there are still questions of the best 
way to interpret the Constitution, such as what to do when there is little to no prior precedent in a 
case. 
In theory, I like the idea of a dead Constitution more, but in practice I favor the idea of 
a living Constitution. Even though it is said that originalism begins with the ‘objective’ words in 
the text, it is difficult for me to consider them impartial when the original language in the Consti-
tution was only agreed upon by straight, slave-owning white men. I like the faithfulness to the 
text that is emphasized in originalism, but when this results in judges consistently coming to ex-
tremely conservative results and shrugging their shoulders and saying it was a coincidence, it 
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makes me take a step away from this method. This doesn’t mean that I think judges should have 
complete and total freedom to interpret laws however they see fit. I believe there have to be gen-
eral guidelines and methods that are strict enough so that judges are not swayed by their own 
personal agenda, yet loose enough that they aren’t forced to come to an absurd ruling in the name 
of doctrinal faithfulness.   
While arguments can be made from both sides of the aisle about the validity of each 
respective interpretive theory, the current state of judicial discussion has shifted away from 
cerebral debates and darted into a state of chaos that is embarrassing and frightening. The judici-
ary, an institution that is supposed to remain apolitical, has become infected with partisanship 
and political squabble. While some people criticized Antonin Scalia for the outcomes he arrived 
at in his rulings, he preached doctrinal fidelity and exemplified intellectualism in the Court. 
When Supreme Court Justices are used as ploys to advance a particular political agenda, there is 
serious risk to the stability of America as a democracy. The Judiciary needs to stand as an unbi-
ased establishment that holds judges to a standard of professionalism and integrity, and once that 
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